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SUBJECT: Basic Attitudes of German Political Leaders to the German Question; and the Present and Potential Reactions of These Leaders to the Soviet Threat to Berlin.

The present report is an analysis of the differing attitudes of German political leaders with respect to the problem of reunification and how to attempt to achieve it; together with a preliminary assessment of their reactions to the Soviet threat to Berlin. The report is divided into three sections: first, a brief analysis of the characteristic attitudes of political leaders regarding reunification (and security) and the problem of how to achieve reunification; second, an analysis of the present and potential reactions of these leaders to the Soviet threat to Berlin; third, a speculative analysis of what the effect may be on the attitudes of these German political leaders, including the Government, if no satisfactory settlement of the Berlin problem has been achieved four or five months from now, and it appears that the Russians will actually withdraw from East Berlin, and turn control of access to Berlin from the Federal Republic over to the GDR.

SUMMARY

Chancellor Adenauer holds support of the majority of the Bundestag and of the electorate and stands firmly on a policy of western alliance and opposition to all compromises with the communists. In the conviction that the Federal Republic's security and survival depend on the presence of American troops and that reunification can only be achieved in the framework of a global detente arising from general controlled disarmament, he opposes discussion of the German problem with the Soviets on any other basis. He fears discussions of disengagement and Germany's military status would lead to American withdrawal and a weakening of the Federal Republic's western ties which are more important in his eyes than reunification. He is also supported by those who believe that negotiations on reunification can only succeed after the Federal Republic has achieved military power, and who tend to think "nationally" and put more emphasis on Germany's strength and importance than on its alliances. However, the threat to Berlin has given a new urgency to broader solutions. The public is profoundly afraid of war in general and in this crisis will look to the Government to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Opposed to the Chancellor's ideas are a group of political leaders (in the opposition parties and some in the CDU) who believe that if reunification is never


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
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to be achieved, the Western powers and the Federal Republic must negotiate with the USSR concerning Germany's future military status; and who are willing to contemplate the withdrawal of western forces from Germany (and Germany not being in NATO) as a means of achieving reunification and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Thus, in the analysis made in this report, - the basic division is that between (1) those who oppose military status negotiations - Group I - the Chancellor and the majority of the CDU/CSU; and (2) those who favor military status negotiations - Group II - the Opposition leaders and a number of dissident CDU leaders.

Within his own party the Chancellor is confronted by those who believe that the only way to resume the negotiations on the German question is on the basis of peace treaty discussions (i.e., discussions of Germany's future military status) in advance of free elections; and advocate further moves toward such negotiations, either because they believe there is a real chance for progress or because they believe this demonstration of genuine interest in reunification and willingness to explore all possibilities is necessary for public opinion in general and especially if there is to be a military showdown on Berlin. These CDU dissidents are, in general, supported by the Berlin SPD and by the FDP who similarly favor discussion of Germany's future military status in the framework of a new European security system. The group represented principally by the SPD in the Federal Republic (as opposed to Berlin) is different from others in its readiness to make concessions in advance of negotiations to improve the atmosphere and, as they see it, to make it possible for the Soviets seriously to consider reunification. They too advocate negotiations on Germany's future military status in the framework of a new European security system.

On the question of Berlin all parties are united in support of the position taken by the western powers at the Paris meeting. However, there is no general readiness to see that policy pursued beyond a show of force to its actual use. Especially in the SPD in the Federal Republic there is a strong trend toward acceptance of a settlement which would be based on dealing with the GDR although not a de jure recognition. As time runs out these pressures will increase. Bearing in mind that the Chancellor fears, above all, negotiations on a military settlement which could lead to the withdrawal of American forces from Germany and the continent before reunification is achieved, our best estimate, and a highly speculative one, is that if the situation develops in such a way that he must choose between (1) war (or real risk of war), (2) broad negotiations involving possible American withdrawal from Germany, or (3) negotiations on Berlin alone, - he would choose the latter. Further, we conclude that, if necessary, he will favor acceptance of GDR controlled access to Berlin and a Berlin settlement amounting in effect to de facto recognition of the GDR by the western powers rather than to face the risk of war or to engage in broad negotiations with the USSR on any basis involving possible withdrawal from Germany of United States forces. It is emphasized that no prediction of the course of development of the Berlin situation is intended; and that the analysis is of probable reactions in a hypothetical situation which may not in fact develop.

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
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For ease of reference there is given here an outline, together with page reference, of the following analysis:

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- Group I. (Those opposed to "military status" negotiations) further defined p.5
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I. Characteristic Attitudes Toward Reunification and the Problem of German Security.

Basic attitudes toward the German problem - the problem of reunification - among German political leaders, officials and the "opinion-forming" strata of the population generally can be broadly divided into two groups (within each of which there are subdivisions) as follows:

Group I. Those Who Oppose Negotiations Now with the USSR on Germany's Future Military Status.

These men believe that the Soviets are not now prepared to concede reunification on an acceptable basis and that, until they are, a priority must be placed on protection of the Federal Republic against Soviet aggression or infiltration. Until reunification can be achieved in the framework of general controlled disarmament, they believe that German survival in the face of Soviet ambitions depends on close alliance with the western powers, the effective military presence of the United States in Berlin and the Federal Republic, and western unity in a policy of "No experiments" which would weaken this position. Therefore, they oppose, at the present time, any kind of disengagement, or European security schemes which might conceivably cause United States forces to withdraw from the territory of the Federal Republic. They have, up till now, also opposed any dealings (apart from low level, truly technical contacts) with the GDR, or concessions to the Soviets in advance of agreement on reunification based on free elections.

This group consists of Chancellor Adenauer and those who broadly share his views, probably the majority of Bundestag deputies and a majority of the electorate. He has won and holds the confidence of his party and the greater part of the voters because the Federal Republic has achieved respectability, prosperity and security while following these policies. The West German public

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is profoundly anti-Soviet and supports a clear and simple policy of firm resistance to Communist encroachment and, on this basis, Adenauer remains in firm control.

Group II. Those Who Favor Negotiations with the USSR on Germany's Future Military Status.

These men either themselves hold so intensely the goal of reunification, or feel that it is politically necessary to take this position, that they would like to have the western powers and the Federal Republic put forward, in negotiation with the USSR (or, for the SPD, in advance thereof), new proposals regarding reunification, disengagement and European security in spite of the fact that this would or might conceivably involve United States forces withdrawing from the territory of the Federal Republic. They feel that the risk involved should American forces withdraw from Germany is acceptable, if at the same time reunification is achieved and Soviet forces withdraw to the USSR. They are prepared to defer free elections to a late stage of reunification.


This group includes a number of dissidents among the CDU leadership; the FDP, the SPD, some Foreign Office officials, and a large number of journalists and other influential individuals such as Protestant churchmen, university professors, etc.

Group I, the "no experiments now" group, opposed to "future-military-status" negotiations, falls broadly into the following subdivisions:

I-A. The "Carolingians". This is a predominantly Catholic group, for the most part born and raised in the Rhineland, Southwest Germany or Bavaria; the men who place primary, almost exclusive, emphasis on the continued freedom and security of the western part of Germany, the Federal Republic. It consists of Chancellor Adenauer and his tried and true followers in the CDU - men whose orientation is not "national"; and who give great emphasis to the importance of firmly establishing a "little Europe" based on the fullest French-German cooperation within an Atlantic alliance. There are certainly many in this group who, in their hearts, do not really care about reunification and certainly not at any risk to their own security and prosperity. The majority and the leadership of this group, however, sincerely believe that there is no real stability or security in a divided Germany. At the same time, they do not believe that the Soviets will give up central Germany except in the framework of a general detente arising from general disarmament. The opposition to this group considers that such an East-West settlement is so remote that to depend on it is to abandon reunification.

This group holds mass support throughout the Federal Republic of those (Catholic or Protestant) who may or may not care about reunification, but who

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fear Communist encroachment, who are content in the prosperity and security of the Federal Republic and who do not want this upset by any dealings with "the Red devil".

I-B. National Element in the CDU/CSU. - symbolized by Defense Minister Strauss. These men at present agree with the "Carolingians" that the presence of United States forces on German territory is absolutely vital to the continued security of the Federal Republic. However, they believe that the United States will not remain in Europe forever, especially in view of new military techniques, and that they must be prepared to fill this vacuum militarily and politically. They also believe that the USSR is not now prepared to concede reunification on any acceptable basis. At the same time they are "national" in outlook, tend to see Germany as western, but at the same time standing between East and West, and not necessarily or naturally a member of an Atlantic community. They believe that the time will come - after buildup of German military forces has been completed - when it will be possible to reestablish German unity by negotiations in which Germany would take the lead with support which the West would not refuse. These men share the Carolingians' belief that it would be a serious mistake to negotiate now for reunification on the basis of a mutual withdrawal of western and Soviet forces; their position, however, is simply that the time has not yet come for such negotiations, because the German military forces are not yet strong enough to ensure Germany's security should United States forces withdraw from German territory. Once the German buildup has been completed to the point of real military strength, these men, in contrast to the Carolingians, will want to negotiate for reunification on a basis of withdrawal of western and Soviet forces, and of German preponderance in Western Europe. They would probably not insist on German NATO membership if some other American guarantee were possible. Defense Minister Strauss and his personal followers; military and "national" minded CDU members, and doubtless many German officers belong to this group. Refugee groups (of decreasing significance), to whom reunification is all-important but who see only danger in dealing with the Communists from weakness, tend to support this position. Also allied are those north German elements who, thinking in a nationalist but anti-Prussian way, support the Chancellor's policies now but not from the same reasons and sentiments. The group altogether is not numerically large but has energy and conviction.

Group II - those who favor negotiations on Germany's future military status with the USSR now, recognizing that such negotiations may involve withdrawal of U.S. forces from German soil, falls into the following subdivisions:

II-A. This group is not only willing to put forward new proposals for reunification and European security but also believes it necessary to improve the atmosphere or placate the Soviets in advance to bring about fruitful negotiations. It comprises the West German SPD, perhaps some in the FDP, and a considerable number of intellectuals. They would take such steps

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
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as to avoid atomic armament of the Federal Republic, hold conventional German forces at a minimum, accept measures of disengagement like the Rapacki Plan; and some, like Carlo Schmid, would even concede the Oder-Neisse line in order to "improve the atmosphere" - all this in advance of any Soviet commitment to permit or to negotiate about reunification. They argue that the West has not gone as far as it must to make reunification possible for the Soviets. They see the chief obstacles to reunification not only in Communist aggressiveness but also in Russian fear of Germany and the Chancellor's NATO policies. They are prepared to give up membership in NATO as a price of reunification, and to accept conventionally armed neutrality for a reunited Germany whose security rests on guarantees by the UN and/or by the U.S. and the USSR for all European states and on American self-interest in seeing no Soviet advance in Europe. They do not believe that the NATO "shield" concept is valid in the rocket age or that the presence of American troops in Germany is essential to an effective American guarantee of their security. They believe Germany will naturally and wisely remain part of the West but they hope closer and friendlier relations with eastern Europe will favor reunification by removing its fear of Germany. They too maintain that free elections must be held at some time before reunification can be considered complete but the point at which they are held is not important to them. They remain opposed to recognition of the GDR despite a growing "soft" minority on this point in their ranks, but believe that some degree of collaboration between the two Germanies pursuant to allied agreement will have to precede real reunification.

II-B. This group comprises those who would like to put forward now new proposals for reunification and European security, but who see the necessity for continued alliance of the Federal Republic with the West which would assure American military presence at least until agreement on reunification is achieved. They, therefore, support German military efforts, the majority of them accepting atomic weapons. They oppose any concessions to the Russians except as part of a settlement under which the Russians grant reunification on the basis of free elections; however, they do not believe these elections need precede agreement on Germany's future military status. The important thing to this group is to end the stagnation in the German problem and somehow to reopen negotiations toward reunification in which some kind of deal could be made probably on the basis of disengagement and limitation of arms in a European zone and possibly a limited and transitional period of confederation until a single German Government can be formed by free elections. The group consists of a small number of dissident CDU leaders (several from Berlin); most of the FDP; the Berlin SPD; and some Foreign Office officials. This sub-group in turn falls into two groups, viz:

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
II-B-1. Those who believe that there is a chance the Russians might permit reunification, on the basis of a prior agreement (to be implemented at the time of reunification) on limitation of German arms and new security agreements affecting all of central Europe, possibly including mutual withdrawal of allied troops. This group consists of a number of Berlin CDU deputies (of whom Gradl is the most outspoken); Lemmer, the Minister for All-German Affairs; Gerstenmaier (CDU), President of the Bundestag, and his followers, and those who are influenced by him in the CDU faction; the Berlin SPD; the FDP; and a number of Foreign Office officials.

Within the group the FDP and the Berlin SPD are prepared to go further than those from the CDU in their willingness to negotiate every sort of disengagement plan. They are not prepared to make concessions in this respect except in negotiations as a quid pro quo for reunification. The FDP is confident of German ability to outwit the Soviets or the GDR (or almost anybody else) at the conference table. They have been the most vigorous proponents of peace treaty negotiations and a Four Power Commission in which representatives of the two parts of Germany would participate. The FDP would not hesitate to deal with Pankow within such a Commission, although they are officially opposed to negotiations with the GDR except as they may be called for by the Four Powers.

In contrast, the CDU element avoids talk of disengagement which, like reunification, they believe will follow from the agreement on Germany's future military status. It is on this last point that Gerstenmaier, Gradl and others propose negotiations under the rubric "peace treaty".

II-B-2. This group includes those in the CDU, like former Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Kiesinger, who share Chancellor Adenauer's feeling that the security and freedom of the Federal Republic should have first priority, but who, nonetheless, feel that it is politically necessary, if the CDU Government is to maintain its hold on the electorate in the future (and especially in the event that it comes to a military showdown over Berlin), for the Government to demonstrate its interest in negotiations toward reunification. For this purpose they want the western powers, in negotiations on reunification, to make a "reasonable" offer to the Russians which would involve withdrawal of the troops of the three western powers from the Federal Republic in return for withdrawal of Soviet troops at least from the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and the substitution of some other guarantee than NATO membership for Germany's security. These men feel that the Russians would almost certainly not accept such an offer and they are motivated chiefly by considerations of public opinion which, they believe, demands a demonstration of flexibility and imagination and willingness to get the German problem off dead center. They may also feel that even if the Russians should accept, German freedom and security could still be preserved, since part of any arrangement acceptable to them would have to be that U.S. and U.K. forces,

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while withdrawing from Germany, remain in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and North Africa and committed to protect Germany. This group includes a number of CDU deputies who think like or are influenced by Kiesinger; and a number of Foreign Office officials.

The dividing line between these two groups (II-B-1 and II-B-2) - those who believe the Russians might accept a "fair" reunification offer, and those who doubt that the Russians would accept such an offer, - is far from firm. There is a marked tendency to shift from one standpoint to the other depending on the tone of the latest Soviet pronouncements and the temperament of the individual concerned.

II. Current and Potential Reactions to the Soviet Threat to Berlin.

All political leaders and groups described above are in agreement that the Soviet program, the Soviet threat to West Berlin, must be firmly rejected by the western powers and the Federal Republic. All are pleased, following the meetings in Paris in mid-December, at the firm stand rejecting the Soviet proposals taken by the three western powers, the Federal Government itself, and the NATO Council as a whole. Furthermore, all parties and the Government are agreed that, in addition to rejecting the Soviet proposals, the western powers and the Federal Republic should seek some kind of negotiations with the USSR. The differences of opinion are on the subject of negotiations to be sought, and on the practical problem of maintaining allied access to Berlin if and when the Russians actually turn their responsibilities for allied access to Berlin over to the GDR.

The following paragraphs summarize the reactions of the various political groups (as defined in Part I above) to the Soviet threat to Berlin as regards (1) how "hard" a line the Allies should take on dealing with the GDR over access to Berlin; and (2) the theme and character of the negotiations which should be undertaken with the USSR following firm rejection of the Soviet Berlin proposals.

1. Attitude of Group I - Those Opposing Negotiations Now in Germany's Future Military Status. Chancellor Adenauer and the Majority of the CDU/CSU.

This group, the Chancellor and his undeviating supporters in the CDU/CSU have to date reacted as follows to the Berlin crisis:

(a) The western powers, the Federal Republic and NATO as a whole must continue firmly to reject the Soviet proposal for Berlin; there must be no question of the western powers dealing with representatives of the GDR over Berlin or access to Berlin; the western powers should insist on their right to land (as well as air) access to Berlin by at least a show of force if necessary; the alternative of an air lift to Berlin should not be considered because in the long run Berlin cannot survive if its communications with the West are only by air.

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(b) On the subject of negotiations with the USSR this group, in line with the Chancellor's thinking, would prefer, if it were possible, to have no negotiations whatsoever now. For them the ideal solution, theoretically, would be that the western powers simply insist on maintaining their rights regarding Berlin, by force if need be; and that the Soviets then back down and restore the old status quo in Berlin.

They must, however, take into account that there prevails in the other NATO countries and in public opinion within the Federal Republic an unwillingness to risk war without efforts to negotiate a settlement. They must also take into account the strong pressure as expressed in the Bundestag resolutions of July 2 and October 1 for general negotiation on the German problem. Therefore the Chancellor although he has stated, and with allied support for, the position that there can be no negotiations under threats of force and pressure of time, has taken the position before the CDU/CSU faction and with leaders of other parties that the Berlin problem should be solved in broader negotiations. Furthermore, this group (i.e., the Government) acting through Foreign Minister von Brentano has committed itself, - by accepting and helping to draft the Paris NATO communique of December 16, 1958, calling for discussion (with the USSR) of "Germany as a whole" and the problems of "European security and disarmament". It is noteworthy that the inclusion of disarmament in the list of subjects to be discussed with the USSR was Chancellor Adenauer's personal suggestion. In commenting on the Paris meetings to the public, official CDU spokesmen have stressed their view that disarmament is the only subject of negotiations which can lead to a solution of the problems of Berlin and of Germany. This is in line with, or an expression of, Chancellor Adenauer's tactic since approximately last April of stressing that there is no use in negotiating on the German problem and European security alone, since only East-West agreement on "universal controlled disarmament" can bring about the reduction of tension, or the degree of international security, needed to make agreement on German reunification and European security possible. What this boils down to as a practical matter is that Chancellor Adenauer and his followers in the CDU/CSU do not in fact want any negotiations on reunification and European security to take place unless there is simultaneously or previously a general East-West settlement of such a nature that Germany and western Europe as a whole would be secure even without the presence of United States forces. Negotiations toward the essential comprehensive agreement between East and West, they believe, depend on the readiness of the USA and the USSR for general controlled disarmament and can hardly be begun and certainly not concluded before the Soviet deadline at the end of May. They believe that negotiations on Germany alone, without hope for the essential broader understanding, will create pressures for dangerous concessions and compromise in the direction of disengagement or neutralization or other special status for Germany without, however, achieving reunification. It is clear that the Chancellor and this group as a whole fear that if there were discussion of reunification and European security on the fresh basis of talks on Germany's future military status, this might lead to United States withdrawal from Europe. They feel that it would be far too dangerous, even if Germany were

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reunited and Soviet forces withdrawn to Russia, if American forces should leave West Germany. They fear, if negotiations were entered into which even contemplate, only to reject, the possibility of the withdrawal of United States forces, that a chain of events would be set in motion which would end in United States withdrawal from Europe. Apparently these men believe that even if, on withdrawing its forces from Germany, the United States should make a treaty commitment to defend Germany from Soviet attack or encroachment, the United States would, in fact, not be able to do so, because it is "unbelievable" that the United States, if its own forces were not immediately and directly involved in conflict, would risk the destruction of New York, Chicago and Washington in order to protect Germany.

In sum, Group I, Adenauer and the bulk of the CDU/CSU evidently prefer that there be no negotiations, except of the broadest type envisaged in the NATO communique; or, at most, that any negotiations be confined on the western side to restatement of the standard western positions on reunification (the 1955 Geneva position) and on disarmament. Meanwhile as stated above, they would like to see the western powers stand firm while making it clear that they are prepared to take action to maintain their position in Berlin and their access by land and air to Berlin without dealing with the GDR. To bolster this position a CDU propaganda campaign is being set in motion to convince the public that it is not only Berlin but all freedom which is at stake and that the West with the Federal Republic must stand absolutely firm.

(c) If and when it appears that the USSR, despite this firm western stand, is not going to back down; and if it seems that a US-GDR or US-Soviet military clash is likely to occur over the western right of free access to Berlin, the Adenauer group will be under great pressure to make further concessions toward negotiations which will reduce the risk of war and save Berlin and which are considered more realistic and immediately possible than world disarmament. Any prediction of the course of these future developments is highly speculative but our best guess now is that Germans as a whole are simply not prepared to face any genuine risk of war over any issue short of an actual Soviet attack on the Federal Republic itself. The public will probably continue to reject both the loss of Berlin and a war to keep it. The Government's efforts to educate them to the point of view that the threat to Berlin is equally a threat to the Federal Republic will probably not reach deep enough, soon enough to bring about any real readiness to fight for Berlin. If the risk of a fight is generally sensed by the public as sharply as it was in the days between November 10 (Khrushchev's speech) and November 27 (the Soviet note offering six months' respite), the force of public opinion will be, even more desperately, in favor of any negotiated settlement. It is, of course, possible that continuing diplomatic exchanges will lull public fears of war until the Soviets turn over control of access to the GDR and the show of force and its possible consequences come about in a situation moving too fast for public opinion to bear heavily on the Government. However, with or without this mass reinforcement, the Opposition, intellectuals especially in the press, and some of the NATO partners will exert a great pressure on the Federal Government to negotiate for a settlement in a framework narrow enough to promise early results. In these circumstances, the Government may well move not to negotiations on the German question, European security, etc. (for the reasons outlined above); but rather to negotiations limited exclusively to the theme of Berlin and access to Berlin. Negotiations limited to this subject can move only in one direction - toward seeking a *modus vivendi* (which will amount to de facto recognition) with the GDR so that allied surface and air access to Berlin can be maintained with GDR agreement after the Soviets have turned over their responsibilities regarding Berlin to the GDR. Thus the paradoxical situation may develop that the Adenauer Government, hitherto the

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staunchest voice against any dealings with the GDR, may advocate the risky course of a deal by the western powers with the GDR over access to Berlin, in order to avoid the (in its eyes) greater risk of broad negotiations with the USSR over Germany's future military status.

2. Attitudes of Those Favoring Negotiations with the USSR on Germany's Future Military Status.

(a) Attitudes of Group II-A - the West German SPD.

This group, the bulk of the West German (not the Berlin) SPD, and others in the FDP and elsewhere of a similar outlook, have to date reacted as follows to the Berlin crisis:

(1) Like the CDU/CSU and other political parties and groups, the SPD holds that the western powers, the Federal Republic and NATO as a whole must continue firmly to reject the Soviet proposals for Berlin. On the question of allied access to Berlin, the bulk of the SPD takes the line that the western powers will probably have to have de facto dealings with the GDR in order to maintain access by land and air to Berlin; and that it would definitely not be worth any risk of fighting merely to avoid such dealings with the GDR over questions of access. It is noteworthy that at this time the SPD organ "Vorwaerts" featured an article by SPD Deputy Kalbitzer saying roughly "Confederation, why not?" Privately, Ollenhauer, Party Chairman, and Mommer, Party Whip, are good examples of leading Social Democrats who do not endorse confederation but who have recently said it is not good to talk publicly now of dealing with the GDR but it is not in fact such a bad thing and may become necessary. The most important of the few ~~exceptions~~ in the SPD who have occasionally privately taken the line that the western powers should fight if necessary to maintain access to Berlin has been that of the tough-minded SPD leader Herbert Wehner. Wehner also, however, has made it clear that he does not believe the United States or the other western powers would in actual fact use force to maintain access to Berlin.

(2) Regarding negotiations, the SPD position is that it is now absolutely essential that the western powers negotiate with the USSR on the German question and European security, since only East-West agreements on these questions can really solve the Berlin problem. They urge almost frantically, that the present crisis be made a turning point in German policy in order that the danger of war be avoided by negotiation; and they have begun attacks on the Chancellor for failing to press in this direction, or even for obstructing an initiative they foresaw from the U.K. for some kind of disengagement. The intensity and depth of this opposition will grow as time runs out. As Wehner put it after the Paris meetings on December 17, (citing Mr. George Kennan whose views are again having some impact here), the West and the Federal Republic are now faced with the "last chance" for possibly fruitful

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negotiations with the Soviets; there should now be parallel western negotiations with the USSR (1) concerning a militarily thinned out and controlled zone; and (2) on preparations for a peace treaty. The position of Wehner and the SPD (like that of Gradl and others of the dissident CDU group (Group II-B)) is that peace treaty negotiations with the USSR will inevitably involve negotiations on Germany's future military status and on reunification.

(3) The SPD and the others of "Group II-A" are not likely to deviate from this position in the coming months. They will continue, in public statements, in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and in Bundestag debate to call urgently for Four Power negotiations on Germany and European security as the only satisfactory way to solve the Berlin crisis. On the other hand if, as the Soviet six-month ultimatum period runs out the Adenauer Government shifts its position to advocacy of a de facto settlement with the GDR on allied rights of access to Berlin, the SPD will probably not oppose this but will simultaneously intensify its accusations that the Federal Government deliberately rejects opportunities for fruitful negotiations on the whole German problem.

(b) Attitudes of Group II-B. The Dissident CDU Leaders, the Bulk of the FDP, the Berlin SPD.


This group, consisting of the influential dissident CDU leaders, most of the FDP leadership, the Berlin SPD, etc., has to date reacted as follows to the Berlin crisis:

(1) Like all other parties and groups, they hold that the West and NATO must continue firmly to reject the Soviet proposals. The evidence as to their views on Berlin is not clear and, on this point, the group is probably not of a single mind. The Berlin SPD is for the use of force if necessary to protect their city. They see control of access in GDR hands as more dangerous even than in Soviet hands and oppose any recognition of Pankow. Dr. Gradl (CDU), as a Berliner, is surely of the same mind. Dr. Gerstenmaier has said privately and forcefully that he is "ready to die" over a challenge to rights of access to Berlin, but it is not clear that he would consider a transfer of control to the GDR as the point on which "to die". The FDP has no reticence about contacts with GDR officials and was privately pleased with the "agent" theory.

(2) Regarding negotiations, in the interest of CDU party unity the Gerstenmaier-Gradl-Kiesinger group has not said much publicly since the receipt of the Soviet notes of November 27. However, the Berlin Deputy Gradl for one has emphasized (in a radio speech on December 14) that the German question must be negotiated; that reunification must be sought "in the framework of a new European security order"; and that a new and stable "balance of power" (Gleichgewicht) must be sought. Gradl has also stated

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privately since November 27 that the approach to settling these problems could be through peace treaty negotiations. The FDP similarly is calling for western negotiations with the USSR on Germany's future military status, disengagement, and a new European security order. The men in this category (Group II-B) would far prefer such broad negotiations on a new basis with the USSR to any settlement of the Berlin crisis by de facto arrangements with the GDR of the type which as indicated above the Adenauer and the majority of the CDU may come to favor. However, Gerstenmaier and the others of this category (with the exception of the Berliners) probably could not and would not oppose such a settlement if the Adenauer government should in the end come out for it.

III. Conclusion; and Speculative Thoughts about Possible Developments in German Policy in the Next Five Months.

From the foregoing analysis we conclude (1) that the Chancellor will be under ever increasing pressure as the stability and security on which his internal success is based seem threatened by a fight over Berlin access; and that developments in German policy in the coming months will depend on the course of western policy and especially of United States policy; (2) that while holding the line by advocacy of negotiations toward general controlled disarmament and a resultant global detente, the basic issues on which the Federal Government must take decisions are: (a) does West Germany really want the three western powers to use force to maintain land access to Berlin? (b) if not, which course should the Federal Republic and the western powers pursue - the course of a negotiated settlement over Berlin alone (involving in one form or another de facto recognition of the GDR); or the course of a new attempt at an all-German and European security settlement by negotiation with the USSR (as distinguished from mere restatement of previous western positions) on the subject of Germany's future military status.

United States policy decisions (in concert with Britain and France) are the really basic factor in the sense that the existing situation (the western position in Berlin and the present state of West German-GDR relations) can clearly be maintained only if the United States with its allies demonstrates in unmistakable fashion that it is prepared to maintain by force the western position in Berlin, and access by land to Berlin. If this is done at an early date, there is at least a chance that the Adenauer Government would support this policy to the bitter end - if it could be convinced that such a policy would in fact cause the USSR to back down and no actual hostilities would occur. In the light of the existing situation, however, with the U.K. and France probably unwilling to commit themselves now to use force to maintain land access to Berlin, the Federal Government will have to formulate its policies on the assumption that the western powers will probably not use force to maintain land access. Within this framework, we venture the following speculative thoughts about developments in West German policy in coming months.

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1. Since the use of force to maintain land access to Berlin appears improbable (among other reasons because in the last analysis, in view of German opinion, even Adenauer would not want it), the policy battle among German political leaders will necessarily be over the issue of whether a settlement (of Berlin's status and the access question) involving de facto recognition of the GDR should be sought; or whether the solution should be sought in broad negotiations between the western powers and the USSR on the German problem and European security on a fresh basis - namely the basis of negotiations on the future military status of United Germany.

2. The policy struggle, because of the dominance of the CDU/CSU in government and parliament, will essentially be fought out within the ranks of the CDU/CSU. The other parties, the DP, FDP and SPD will also play a minor role, both because the Chancellor has made it clear that in this time of crisis he will consult them regularly, and because they do have a voice in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and of course in Bundestag debate.

3. Within the CDU/CSU the struggle will be between the Adenauer forces opposed to negotiations on Germany's future military status (Group I above) and the dissident but influential CDU leaders who for various reasons favor negotiations on Germany's future military status (Group II-B above). Because the influence of this latter group is likely to increase in the coming months, their ideas and possible lines of action are further discussed in the following paragraphs.

4. On the German political scene this group, or way of thinking about the German problem, is symbolized by the names Gerstenmaier, Kiesinger and Gradl - men who have much influence in the CDU Bundestag faction as experts on foreign affairs. Some observers would add Lemmer and even Krone to the list. They are the men in the CDU, in influential positions, who have made it clear that they think the time has come when the West and the Federal Republic should probe Russian intentions regarding Germany and central Europe, and (if it is a bluff) call the Russian bluff. There is also ample evidence that this group includes some of those in the Foreign Office who are or have been responsible for preparing the German position for future negotiations on the German problem - for discussion first with the three western powers and NATO (the Four Power Working Group on reunification) with a view to later use in actual negotiations with the Russians. It will be recalled that there have been indications Eckardt and Blankenhorn have been of a similar mind.

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5. We know that the Foreign Office working level, like the Gerstenmaier, Kiesinger, Gradl political group, favor the idea of preliminary negotiations between the western powers and the USSR on United Germany's future military status before the actual holding of free elections. They would be prepared, in return for Soviet agreement to reunification, to sacrifice the Oder-Neisse

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territories. (This point would also find support in all parties, with the exception of the expellee groups.) They would also be prepared, in return for reunification, to give up equipping German forces with atomic weapons, to see limitations on the size of German forces (if satellite forces are similarly limited) and to have U.S. troops withdraw from Germany to France if Soviet troops withdraw from the satellites. They also feel, like the politicians, - that an offer involving these features would probably not be accepted by the Russians; and that it would decidedly increase the government's ability to follow a strong "integration-in-NATO cum atomic weapons" course, if such an offer were made to the Russians and rejected by them. These men argue that such an offer would go far to clear the atmosphere in Germany, clearly demonstrating that, contrary to the SPD-FDP view (and the view of ~~many~~ intellectuals and leading journalists), the Russians are not interested in detente and a peaceful settlement but really are aggressively expansionist and determined to uphold the Communist regime in the East Zone at any cost, and to expand it to include West Berlin.

6. It is important to remember that the representatives of this group in the CDU Bundestag faction (Gerstenmaier, Kiesinger and Grädl) are the men who, against the wishes of the Chancellor and his supporters, working with the SPD and the FDP, secured unanimous Bundestag approval of the Bundestag resolutions of July 2 and October 1, 1958 both of which called in effect for new approaches to the problem of negotiations on reunification with the USSR. They also caused CDU and Government acceptance of the language of the German note of November 17, 1958 to the USSR.

7. We would further stress that as Embassy telegram 1160 of December 2 pointed out, the Soviet Berlin note "unleashes powerful pressures on German opinion in the direction of reaching some kind of accommodation with the USSR through negotiations"; and that the note "greatly encourages those elements in Germany -- who are in favor of reaching some kind of accommodation in central Europe --". The elements which are really important in this connection are precisely this second rank element in the CDU leadership itself symbolized by Gerstenmaier, Kiesinger and Grädl. It is possible that the influence of this group may increase as the months go by, and that many CDU voters will become increasingly interested in the possibility of negotiations with the USSR on a fresh basis as an alternative to flat rejection of the Soviet moves in Berlin, with the risk of a military showdown such a course would involve. Another factor is that Senator Humphrey's activities and the forthcoming Mikoyan visit to Washington have given new impetus to recurring rumors that the United States and the USSR may come to some agreement over Germany's head. This adds to the strength of those who argue in favor of broad Western-USSR negotiations (with German participation) on the German problem now.

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8. On the other hand, the pressures on Berlin and the attendant risks of war will have the effect of building up a ~~major~~ feeling among the masses whose thoughts on policy are largely limited to their own immediate security that there must be "talk" of almost any kind rather than fighting. Under these circumstances Chancellor Adenauer may, as we think likely, prefer to negotiate a settlement on Berlin alone, necessarily involving western de facto recognition of the GDR (rather than risk withdrawal of United States forces by entering broad negotiations on Germany's future military status). He can probably take the bulk of CDU/CSU voters and Bundestag deputies with him on this course. Further the SPD (outside Berlin), with its advocacy of more and higher level contacts with the GDR, could hardly seriously oppose this course; and the FDP would also probably not oppose.

9. Thus, if the above analysis be correct, the decision will as usual really be up to the Chancellor. He will continue to be able to carry the majority of the CDU/CSU with him. His decision will be determined in part by the influences brought to bear on him. There will be strong pressures on him through the influence of the Berlin CDU (Gradl and Lemmer and perhaps Krone) and such men as Gerstenmaier and Kiesinger in the CDU Bundestag faction to follow the course of broad negotiations on the German and European security problems on a fresh basis; there will also be strong pressures on him not to follow this course, but to seek a settlement on Berlin alone involving in one way or another western de facto recognition of the GDR.

If there is no escape from pressing realities in the remote possibility of a global detente and if he is faced with the alternatives of:

(a) war (or the serious risk of it) which would probably not be supported by his allies or his public;

(b) negotiations on a new basis on the broad questions of Germany and European security, toward which he would be strongly pressed by the opposition both in and outside his party, but which he opposes because of the inherent danger of US military withdrawal under such a plan; or

(c) negotiations on Berlin alone, involving in one way or another de facto western recognition of the GDR, which would be generally accepted except in Berlin,

our guess at the present time is that Chancellor Adenauer would, because of his own outlook and temperament, choose the last course, distasteful as it would be and realizing that it might only defer a showdown on the question of western forces remaining in Berlin.

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William R. Tyler
Counselor of Embassy

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